Electronically Filed
2/7/2019 2:08 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CORY L. ALVARADO,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 46250
Washington County Case No.
CR-2018-2530

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Alvarado failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty plea to injuring jails?

Alvarado Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Alvarado was on parole, and had been incarcerated in the Washington County Jail for
approximately one month following his arrest for disturbing the peace, when he “started ripping
everything apart” in “pod 200” and “shattered” two porcelain sinks in the bathroom, leaving
water “shooting out of the pipes,” before he went into the dayroom and “pulled the television off

its shelf, let it crash to the floor, then grabbed the receiver and threw it at the television, after
(PSI, pp.1-2, 4-5. 1)

which he stomped on the television twice.”

Deputies subsequently

attempted to search Alvarado “to be sure he hadn’t hidden a shard of porcelain on him from the
broken sinks”; however, Alvarado refused to comply with their instructions and “physically
resisted against the deputies and was taken to the floor where he was detained in handcuffs and
then secured in the restraint chair.” (PSI, p.2.)
The state charged Alvarado with injuring jails and resisting and/or obstructing officers.
(R., pp.30-31.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Alvarado pled guilty to injuring jails and the state
dismissed the remaining charge and agreed to not file a persistent violator enhancement. (R.,
pp.33-35; Tr., p.20, Ls.18-23.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with
three years fixed. (R., pp.48-50.) Alvarado filed a notice of appeal timely, under the prison
mailbox rule, 2 from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.52-56.)
Alvarado asserts that the three-year fixed portion of his sentence is excessive in light of
his employment, lack of documented incidents of drug or alcohol use, and completion of sex
offender treatment while on parole, and because, he claims, “a lower fixed term would encourage
[him] to follow the rules in prison.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) The record supports the
sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
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Under the “mailbox rule,” notices of appeal filed by inmates are deemed to be filed on the date
they are delivered to prison officials for filing with the court. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 786
P.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1990), cited with approval in Munson v. State, 128 Idaho 639, 917 P.2d 796
(1996).
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621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for injuring jails is five years. I.C. § 18-7018. The
district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, which falls well
within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.48-50.) Furthermore, Alvarado’s sentence is appropriate
in light of his ongoing disregard for the law and the terms of community supervision, his
unwillingness to abide by institutional rules, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite
numerous prior legal sanctions and treatment opportunities.
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Alvarado’s criminal record dates back to 1992 and includes convictions for minor in
possession of alcohol, possession of marijuana, disturbing the peace, assault/domestic violence,
lewd conduct with a minor, three convictions for resisting and obstructing, two convictions for
driving without a valid driver’s license, three convictions for driving without privileges, and four
convictions for DUI. (PSI, pp.2, 105-06.) His record also contains numerous probation and
parole violations. (PSI, pp.3-5, 38-39, 63-70, 106, 136-37, 145-46.) Alvarado has continued to
commit crimes and use illegal drugs despite having been afforded a plethora of rehabilitative
opportunities, including inpatient treatment, outpatient treatment, a “withdrawal management
program,” self-help groups, and the retained jurisdiction program. (PSI, pp.5, 11, 17, 110, 134,
139, 142, 150.) He told the substance abuse evaluator that he had been incarcerated in the
Washington County Jail for 76 of the past 90 days, and that he had used methamphetamine on
each of the remaining 14 days, admitting that he uses “1 ½ grams” intravenously on a daily basis.
(PSI, pp.11, 14.) He also advised that, “of the people he had regularly worked or gone to school
with during the past year,” “all were involved in illegal activity” and “all used drugs during the
past 90 days.” (PSI, p.15.)
Approximately one month before he committed the instant offense, Alvarado was
arrested for disturbing the peace after he “‘act[ed] aggressively’” for several days, threatened his
brother and mother and called his mother vulgar names, “threatened to kill everyone and trash
the house,” and “broke the television to prove he was serious about his threat.” (PSI, pp.1, 4.)
Alvarado was still incarcerated in the Washington County Jail when he committed the instant
offense 34 days later, during which he – while sober and without apparent provocation – began
“acting up and throwing things” and, after deputies escorted him to a holding cell, “started
ripping everything apart,” destroying a television and two sinks, damaging the pipes, and causing
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flooding problems. (PSI, pp.1-2; R., p.10.) He then refused to comply with deputies’ orders,
“physically resisted against the deputies,” and ultimately had to be “secured in [a] restraint
chair.” (PSI, p.2.) Jail staff told the presentence investigator that “Alvarado subsequently
threatened to take deputies ‘out’ and has since required a two[-]deputy escort whenever he exits
his cell so as to not have the opportunity to destroy property or harm anyone.” (PSI, p.2.) The
presentence investigator recommended a prison sentence “[b]ased on the level of unprovoked
and inexplicable destruction inflicted by [Alvarado], coupled with his pending parole revocation
hearing.” (PSI, p.5.)

Alvarado’s parole officer likewise concluded that Alvarado requires

programming in “a structured environment,” declaring, “It is clear that Parolee Alvarado poses a
significant threat to public safety.” (PSI, p.39.)
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision, noted that the instant offense is Alvarado’s third felony conviction and that “all of those
previous felonies had the sentence imposed,” and concluded that a unified sentence of five years,
with three years fixed was appropriate, stating, “I’m looking at someone who is very aggressive
and threatening when using Methamphetamine and who continues to use Methamphetamine. So
I think there is a protection of society issue.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-19.) Alvarado’s sentence is
appropriate in light of the danger he poses to society, his long history of criminal offending, his
unwillingness to abide by the terms of community supervision and/or institutional rules, and his
failure to rehabilitate or be deterred. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Alvarado has failed
to establish an abuse of discretion.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Alvarado’s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 7th day of February, 2019.
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